We examine the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity using the microdata underlying the BLS's employment cost index. This dataset has two significant advantages over those used previously. It is an extensive, nationally representative dataset based on establishment records and is thus free from much of the reporting error that has plagued earlier work. Even more important, the data are unique in containing detailed information on benefit costs, allowing a first look at the rigidity of total compensation (that is, wages plus benefits). In general, we find significantly stronger evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity than did studies using panel data on individuals. Although total compensation appears somewhat more flexible than wages and salaries alone, we still find a significant amount of rigidity for compensation. Furthermore, the greater flexibility of compensation does not seem to reflect the deliberate attempt by firms to use benefits to circumvent wage and salary rigidity.
Introduction
Workers may resist pay cuts for many reasons, most obviously because cuts lead to a lower standard of living, but also because they may be perceived as unfair or demeaning. When combined with money illusion, this resistance to lower real wages translates into downward nominal wage rigidity. Such rigidity would be a concern for monetary policy if it generated a long-run negative correlation between unemployment and inflation. Specifically, if resistance to nominal pay cuts impedes the smooth adjustment of real wages to adverse shocks, then higher inflation could improve labor-market efficiency by increasing the range of real wage cuts acceptable to workers, leading to lower unemployment in equilibrium. 1 In this paper, we use a newly available data set--the microdata underlying the Bureau of Labor Statistics' employment cost index (ECI)--to shed light on two important unanswered questions on downward nominal wage rigidity.
2 First, despite a number of recent studies, there is no consensus on the extent of such rigidity. Anecdotal evidence and interviews with selected individuals and firms strongly suggest that workers view nominal wage cuts as unfair and that firms are reluctant to impose them. 3 However, more quantitative studies using nationally representative data have been limited to panel datasets of households, especially the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and have found only a modest amount of downward nominal wage rigidity. 4 One commonly cited reason for the comparatively weak support for downward nominal wage rigidity is that these data are hampered by measurement error, which could mask the extent of rigidity (Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry, 1996, Shea, 1997) . Altonji and Devereaux (1999) model the measurement error and find greater evidence of rigidity but are forced to make strong assumptions about the nature of the measurement error and the underlying shape of the distribution. Using an identification strategy that relies on much less restrictive assumptions, Gottschalk (2000) also attributes the majority of wage cuts in the PSID to measurement error. As an alternative, Wilson (1999) uses payroll records over a number of years from two large firms--which, presumably, are nearly free from measurement error--and finds considerable downward nominal wage rigidity. Altonji and Devereux (1999) also find indications of substantial downward rigidity using data from one year at a large firm. Unfortunately, it is unclear whether these firms are representative of the overall labor market.
The ECI combines the advantages of these two approaches. Because the data are derived from employers' records, they are much less prone to measurement error than are the household data. And, the sample size of the ECI is substantial, covering about 5,000 5 Groshen and Schweitzer (1996) analyze a related question using firm-based data, but their dataset is limited to jobs for nonproduction workers in selected industries in several cities. private establishments per quarter. 5 Thus, these data have the potential to shed considerable light on the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity. An additional advantage is that the ECI data follow compensation for jobs rather than individuals, arguably a more relevant unit of labor input from the firm's perspective.
One significant contribution of our paper over the previous literature is that it provides a look at the behavior of total compensation and not just wages. Firms presumably care about total labor costs, not just the wage or salary component of costs. Therefore, data on benefits, which constitute about one-third of total compensation, is crucial. The datasets used previously, however, do not contain comprehensive information on benefits. Thus, a second critical unanswered question in the debate on nominal wage rigidity is whether employers use benefits--which are more difficult for workers to value and compare--to achieve the necessary flexibility that is prevented by the nominal rigidity of wages. Because our ECI data include the only nationally representative information on a wide range of benefit costs, we can provide the first test of this hypothesis--that is, we can investigate whether downward nominal rigidity of compensation (wages plus benefits) differs from rigidity of wages alone.
To anticipate our results, we find about half as many wage cuts in our data as would have been predicted in the absence of downward nominal wage rigidity--much stronger evidence of rigidity than is found in the PSID. This is so despite the fact that the extent of rigidity for jobs (as in the ECI) ought to be less than for individuals (as in the PSID), as we will show. In addition, we find that benefits add some additional flexibility to compensation in our data: Compensation also exhibits downward nominal rigidity, but to a somewhat lesser degree than do wages and salaries alone. However, this increased flexibility does not seem to reflect deliberate attempts by the firm to circumvent downward wage and salary rigidity using benefits.
Measuring the Extent of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
To quantify the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity, we examine the distribution of wage (or compensation) changes. In the absence of downward nominal wage rigidity, we would expect the distribution of wage changes to be essentially continuous through the point of zero wage change--although there may be reasons, such as the existence of long-term contracts, for a concentration of observations at exactly zero even without such rigidity. In contrast, the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity would imply a distinct shortage of nominal wage cuts, with a corresponding pile-up of observations at zero wage change--zero being the minimum wage change acceptable to workers.
Thus, this shortage of negative wage-change observations implies a particular type of asymmetry, or right-skewness, in the distribution. However, simply showing that the wage-change distribution is skewed to the right is not enough, because the underlying distribution could be skewed even in the absence of downward nominal wage rigidity. More persuasive would be evidence that this asymmetry becomes increasingly pronounced as inflation declines.
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For a discussion and assessment of other tests that have been used in the literature, see the working paper version of our paper, Lebow, Saks, and Wilson (1999). 7 For the PSID, McLaughlin (1998) presents evidence suggesting that the underlying wage-change distribution indeed may be skewed to the right. 8 One reason this assumption may be questionable is if the distribution becomes less disperse as inflation falls and the distribution shifts left (see Card and Hyslop, 1997) . In fact, our distributions are about equally disperse in high-and low-inflation years. This paper makes use of two tests designed explicitly to capture the features of wage distribution affected by downward nominal rigidity--the asymmetry measure from Lebow, Stockton, and Washer (1995) , which we refer to as the "LSW statistic", and the "Kahn test" proposed in Kahn (1997) . 6 The LSW statistic is defined as the cumulative frequency of the wage-change distribution above twice the median minus the cumulative frequency of the distribution below zero: LSW / [1 -F(2*median)] -F(0). Figure 1 helps explain this test. Because twice the median and zero are equidistant from the median, a symmetric distribution will have an equal mass in the right and left tails, and the LSW statistic will be zero. But with downward nominal wage rigidity, there will be a shortage of nominal wage cuts, and the LSW statistic will be positive. This measure of asymmetry will become larger as inflation (and the median of the distribution) declines.
The LSW statistic measures precisely the asymmetry generated by downward nominal wage rigidity--a shortage of observations less than zero. And, because it is a pure order statistic, the LSW statistic is unaffected by extreme observations. However, the LSW statistic has the drawback that it is not robust to asymmetry in the underlying wage-change distribution. Thus, if the wage-change distribution is right-skewed, independent of downward nominal wage rigidity, then as inflation falls and the distribution shifts to the left, the LSW statistic would change, even if the shape of the distribution did not (figure 1, lower panel).
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Our second test is from Kahn (1997) . Like the LSW statistic, the Kahn test is structured to measure precisely the hypothesized effects of downward nominal wage rigidity on the wage-change distribution, and it is robust to outliers. A significant advantage is that the Kahn test does not assume that the underlying distribution is symmetric. The only distributional assumption made is that the shape of the distribution is invariant to inflation in the absence of downward nominal wage rigidity. 8 Specifically, this test compares heights of histogram bars a given distance from the median of the wage-change distribution in years when those bars fall completely below nominal zero with their height when they fall at or above nominal zero. To estimate it, we construct a histogram for each year's distribution (with bars 1 percentage point wide) and estimate a system of equations like the following:
where PROPr t is the proportion of observations in the bar r percentage points below the median in year t (or, more precisely, the proportion of observations that fall in the range greater than the median-r-1 and less than or equal to the median-r). DNEGr t is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 when PROPr t is completely below zero and DZEROr t is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 when PROPr t contains zero. The system includes as many equations as there are histogram bars that fall at or above zero in some years and below zero in others (written here as the bars ranging from 1 to m percentage points below the median). The interpretation of the estimated parameters--n, z, and p 1 through p m --will be discussed below.
We explain these equations with the help of figure 2. Consider the equation for the height of the bar 3 percentage points below the median, PROP3 t . In years when the median is greater than 4, all observations in this bar are positive, DNEG3 t and DZERO3 t are both zero, and we estimate the height of the bar to be p 3 (top panel). But in years when the median is less than 3, (lower panel) all observations in the bar are negative, DNEG3 t equals one, and we estimate the height of the bar to be (1+n)p 3 . The parameter n--the primary parameter of interest--captures the extent to which the histogram bar is altered when it comprises only negative observations, that is, when it falls completely below nominal zero. If n=0, then the bar is the same height in either case, and there is no downward nominal rigidity. If n=-1, there are no negative wage changes--an extreme case of downward nominal wage rigidity. We have drawn figure 2 for the intermediate case of n=-1/2. Note that we constrain n to be the same in each equation. Again, the Kahn test has one equation for each bar that falls above zero in some years and below zero in others (bars in the dotted box in figure 2), for these are the bars that help identify n.
In years when the median wage change is between 3 percent and 4 percent (middle panel), DNEG3 t is zero but DZERO3 t equals one, and the bar is larger than p 3 . The term reflects the assumption that any observations that are prevented from showing negative wage change by downward rigidity will appear as zero wage change instead. This parameterization assumes that the histogram bar at zero wage change will become larger as inflation declines because more of the distribution will fall below nominal zero, and the rigidity will therefore affect a larger portion of the distribution. We also allow the bar that includes zero to be boosted by a constant amount in each year, z. This parameter accounts 9 For example, the ECI will not register an increase if some employees get married and switch from individual health insurance coverage to more-expensive family coverage. However, if a relatively low-cost HMO begins to be included among the choice of health plans and some workers switch to the HMO, then this switching would be viewed as induced by the policy change, and the ECI would include the switch to the HMO as a reduction in health insurance costs.
(2)
for long-term contracts or other reasons besides downward rigidity for a concentration of observations at zero nominal wage change.
Finally, as in Kahn (1997) we actually estimate a slightly more complicated version of this model that includes three additional dummies--UP1 and UP2 to signal when a bar is 1 or 2 percentage points above the bar that contains nominal zero and DOWN1 to signal when a bar falls immediately below the bar that contains nominal zero. Thus, the equations are of the form:
and three additional parameters (d1, u1, and u2) are estimated. If menu costs exist and firms are reluctant to give small wage changes, regardless of sign, the bars immediately above and below zero will capture that effect. This specification will assure that our n and z coefficients are picking up downward nominal rigidities that are independent of menu costs.
The ECI Data
The BLS's ECI program collects data quarterly on the hourly cost of wages and benefits in specific job categories in an establishment. The sample is intended to be representative of the private nonfarm sector of the economy (excluding households and the self employed). Each establishment remains in the sample for around three to four years before it is replaced by another establishment within the same industry. Because the compensation cost data are collected from payroll records, they should be far less affected by measurement error than are compensation data from surveys of individuals (like the PSID): Aside from pure data entry problems there ought to be minimal rounding bias, upward reporting bias, or recall error.
The dataset has detail on wages and salaries and a large number of benefit categories including cash bonuses, insurance, retirement plans, paid leave, premiums for overtime and alternative shifts, and legally-required benefits such as social security and federal and state unemployment. Two features of these benefits data bear mentioning. First, the costs of several benefits tend to move together with base wages and are explicitly measured as such in the ECI. If base wages rise 1 percent, then in the absence of other changes, the ECI's costs of paid leave and differentials for overtime and alternative shifts also will rise 1 percent. Second, the ECI is unaffected by changes in the usage of benefits, unless this usage change is itself believed to be induced by a change in benefits policy. 9 10 The ECI does not distinguish between salaried workers and hourly-wage workers, so we were unable to compare these groups. Nor are commissions recorded separately in the ECI. 11 Responses are imputed in the ECI most commonly when some but not all of the compensation information for a particular job is missing. We exclude such observations to avoid comparisons between actual and imputed cost levels. Taking out the imputed data does not change the industry or occupation mix of our sample, nor does it qualitatively change any of the results in this paper.
Not all of the ECI's benefits are equal when it comes to thinking about circumventing wage rigidity. The growing emphasis on "pay for performance" systems suggests that manipulating bonuses in order to target pay to individuals is fairly routine for firms. Firms may target larger groups of employees (but not individuals) by varying benefits such as insurance, retirement plans, and paid leave--though it would surely be impractical to make such changes with any frequency. However, the firm has no discretion in changing legally required benefits and certainly cannot use them to single out individuals or even groups of workers. For these reasons, we have chosen to exclude the legally-required benefits and to consider two compensation measures: Wages and salaries, which includes straight-time hourly wage and salary costs, including commissions 10 and total compensation excluding legally-required benefits which adds most benefit costs over which the firm has some discretion, including paid leave (vacation, holiday, and sick leave), supplemental pay (nonproduction bonuses, overtime, and shift differentials), health and life insurance, retirement and savings plans, and severance pay.
The ECI sample comprises data on an average of about four jobs per establishment in about 5,000 establishments each quarter, yielding roughly 18,000 total observations per quarter. We examine twelve-month (log) changes in compensation costs, and we picked June-to-June observations to maximize the number of years available. We do not use observations that have been excluded from the calculation of the published ECI, nor do we use observations with values imputed by the BLS (as opposed to values reported by the firm).
11 When we restrict our sample to contain only those observations with consecutive June-to-June, non-imputed values for all benefits, we end up with roughly 5,000 observations per year from 1981 through 1999.
Chart 1 shows the mean June-to-June change in the ECI for total compensation from our sample, along with changes in the published ECI; our micro data aggregate to be very close to the published index in most years. (To calculate these averages, as with all results in this paper, we weight each job's wage change by the number of employees in the overall population represented by that job.) As can be seen, the mean ECI change in our sample falls from 9 percent in 1981 to around 2 percent by 1995, after which it edges higher to around 4 percent by 1999.
Jobs versus individuals
One feature of the ECI data is that the unit of observation is the average compensation for a "job" rather than for an individual. In particular, for a narrowly defined occupation within every sampled establishment, the BLS collects data on the compensation paid to each 12 Examples of jobs might be accountant grade 1, junior electrician, or administrative secretary. The median number of employees in a job is 7 in establishments of 100 or more employees, and is 2 in smaller establishments. (The sample is about evenly split between smaller and larger establishments.) Chart 1 ECI for Compensation (Percent change, June -June) individual in that job and then records the average of those figures.
12 One possible effect of this recording strategy is that, by reporting averages, these data may obscure or generate compensation cuts not found in the underlying individual data. The direction of this averaging effect on estimates of downward rigidity is unclear a priori. For example, if the employee with the most tenure and highest pay in a given job category were to retire, the average pay in the job could fall and be recorded in our data as a "nominal wage cut," even though no individual actually received a pay cut. A counter example would be if a pay raise to one worker in a given job were sizable enough to mask pay cuts given to others in that job.
However, two other datasets, with information on both individuals and jobs, help to shed light on the direction of the averaging effect. First, Wilson (1999) shows that there is notably less downward rigidity for job averages than for individuals using data on the internal labor market of a large firm that tracks both individuals and jobs over a 12-year period. Second is evidence from unpublished BLS data from the National Compensation Survey between 1997 and 1998. Unlike the ECI, the NCS data include the number of individuals per job, so we can restrict our attention to jobs with the same number of individuals in successive interviews. Because these jobs could contain precisely the same individuals in the two interviews--in which case they would be free of composition changes--they are more representative of data on individuals than are those jobs where the number of individuals changed. Indeed, jobs in the NCS with the same number of individuals in successive interviews had considerably fewer negative wage-change observations (4 percent versus 17 percent) and a larger spike at zero wage change (20 percent versus 11 percent), 13 We thank Mike Lettau for providing these calculations.
14 See Barth (1997) for a discussion of the literature on how pay moves with tenure/experience/ productivity. providing further evidence that the averaging of wages in the ECI job-level data tends to diminish the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity. 13 This evidence indicates that the average compensation of a job is more downwardly flexible than the compensation of individuals within the jobs. Thus, the estimates of downward nominal wage rigidity that we find for the ECI will be lower bounds to the estimates of downward wage rigidity for individuals. To anticipate our results, this makes our finding of significantly more downward nominal wage rigidity than in studies using panel data on individuals even more striking. It also suggests that whatever measurement problems may be generated by using job averages are dwarfed by the error in surveys such as the PSID.
From the perspective of firms' employment decisions, arguably the cost of the job is more relevant than the cost of an individual worker. First of all, many firms tend to allocate budgets independently from the number of workers--for example, individual departments in firms often get a set increase in their overall budget. Furthermore, personnel departments think in terms of broadly defined job categories rather than the individuals that fill them. These factors clearly suggesting that firms think in terms of department or function costs rather than individuals' wages. More formally, Lazear (1995) discusses several models showing how job categories can become important determinants of compensation. These theories include tournaments, hierarchies and task assignment. Using data on wages in a large firm, Lazear (1992) finds that more than 80 percent of the variation of wages in the firm can be attributed to variation across jobs, while less than 20 percent of the variation occurs within job categories. This evidence indicates that job categories are important when the firm evaluates its costs.
Thus, as long as job-average wages are flexible, the refusal of individuals to accept wage cuts might not affect the firm's hiring and firing decisions. This would be especially likely if workers' pay differences did not fully reflect differences in productivity. For example, the retirement of a high-wage, long-tenure worker may bring down the average wage in the job, leading to a reduction in the firm's costs even adjusting for productivity. 14 In this case, our data would appropriately record a nominal decline in job-average wages, while downward nominal wage rigidity at the individual level would not be a relevant factor in the firm's decisions.
Results
We address three questions in our empirical work: How extensive is downward nominal wage rigidity? Do benefits help achieve more downward flexibility in compensation? And, if so, is this use of benefits a deliberate response by firms to wage rigidity?
As discussed in the methodology section, the implications of downward nominal wage rigidity are most clearly seen in the distribution of wage changes. If workers resist pay cuts and wages are rigid, we expect the distribution of wage changes to be positively asymmetric with a massing of observations at zero and a dropoff below zero. More 15 The statistical significance of the LSW statistic can be calculated as follows. If we observe a fraction a of observations in the right tail, then the binomial formula gives confidence bounds around our right-tail probability estimate as , where z( /2) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution and N is the number of observations. If we observe a fraction b of observations in the left tail, we can construct an equivalent confidence bound for the left-tail probability. We can then test whether the two probabilities are equal. Using this procedure, we calculate approximate standard errors of about 0.25 percentage point on the LSW statistics, making all of the estimates in table 1 strongly statistically significant. important, if wages are nominally rigid, then the asymmetry and massing at zero should become more pronounced in low-inflation times.
What is the extent of downward nominal rigidity in wages?
Chart 2 and table 1 present summary distributions and statistics for our data. The data are year-to-year changes from 1981 to 1999 in the log of wages and salaries for all private industry jobs in the ECI sample. The top panel of chart 2 displays the distribution of wage changes for all years; to highlight the asymmetry, we also display a normal distribution centered around the median of our sample. As can be seen, the distribution of wage changes displays evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity--it has a clear spike at zero and a shortage of observations below zero.
The first row of table 1 shows that roughly 14½ percent of all wage changes are negative and about 18½ percent are zero over the period from 1981 to 1999. As measured by the LSW statistic discussed above, the distribution of wage changes is positively and significantly asymmetric with over 13 percent more observations in the upper tail than in the lower. 15 The table also compares the ECI to wage changes in the PSID, which covers the years 1971-1988 and is taken from Lebow, Stockton and Wascher (1995) . The Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher (1995) .
Chart 2 Distribution of Changes in Various Compensation Measures
(All Years) 16 We thank Robert Shimer for suggesting this test.
micro-ECI data have fewer observations below zero, a much larger concentration at zero, and greater asymmetry than the PSID. Of course, this larger degree of truncation may reflect the larger median wage change in the PSID data because the PSID sample includes the highinflation 1970s. While the evidence above is suggestive of downward nominal wage rigidity, the true test is to see how the distribution varies with inflation. As a first pass, the second and third rows of table 1 contain summary statistics for years where the distributions have the highest and lowest medians. It is clear that the spike at zero and the dropoff below zero are more pronounced in low-median years: The proportion of observations of exactly zero wage change is 21 percent in the low-median years versus 11 percent in the high-median years. The LSW asymmetry measure declines from almost 14 percentage points to less than 4 percentage points when moving from the low-to the high-median years. As a more detailed pass, chart 3 shows the distribution of wage and salary changes for each year in our sample. Again, one can see evidence of less truncation in 1981 and 1982, the years in our sample with the highest inflation.
For a more formal examination, table 2 presents the results of our preferred tests for downward nominal wage rigidity, the correlation of the LSW statistic with measures of inflation, and the Kahn test. The first two rows show the results of OLS regressions of the LSW asymmetry measure for each year's distribution on either the median of the ECI wagechange distribution or inflation (measured as the Q2-to-Q2 change in the log of the PCE chain price index). The regressions also include the unemployment rate to control for possible effects of the business cycle on the shape of the wage-change distribution. If the asymmetry in the wage change distribution were due to nominal wage rigidity, we would expect the LSW statistic to fall as inflation rises and the distribution is shifted further away from zero. This would imply a negative coefficient on inflation and the median of the distribution. Indeed, as seen in table 2, we find that these coefficients are negative and significant. For example, a 1 percentage point increase in the median of the distribution implies almost a 1.8 percentage point decline in asymmetry.
While the correlation of the LSW asymmetry measure with inflation provides evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity, recall from our earlier discussion that we could also obtain a negative correlation between asymmetry and inflation if the underlying distribution of wage changes were skewed for other reasons. As a simple test of whether our LSW results are driven by skewness unrelated to downward wage rigidity, we calculated a more general class of asymmetry statistics of the form [1-F((1+k)*median)]-F((1-k)*median), where k takes on various values less than 1. The correlation of these other asymmetry statistics with inflation was positive and insignificantly different from zero, suggesting that our LSW results in table 2 are indicative of downward rigidity, and not a reflection of more general features of the distribution. 16 17 The model is estimated using nonlinear least squares. We note three features of this estimation, none of which affects the results qualitatively. First, following Kahn, we use SUR to account for correlation in the errors across equations. Second, we weight the data for each year by the number of observations used in generating that year's wage change distribution. Third, because the dependent variables are limited--heights of histogram bars cannot be negative--we perform a logistic transformation on each equation. That is, for the first equation in (1), PROP2 = f(.), we actually estimate ln[PROP2/(1-PROP2)] = ln[f(.)/(1-f(.)]. .
(.05)
Note. * indicates significance at the 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. 1. OLS regression of the LSW asymmetry measure on an inflation measure, the unemployment rate, and a constant. Data for each year are weighted by the number of observations of that year's wage change distribution. PSID results are taken from Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher (1995) . 2. Results are estimated using SUR in nonlinear least squares. In each equation, the fraction of compensation changes in the region between r and r-1 percentage points below the median is regressed on a constant and a set of dummy variables, using a logistic transformation. Data for each year are weighted as in 1. PSID results are taken from Kahn (1997) .
The results of our second test, the Kahn test, are shown in the remainder of table 2.
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Recall that the n coefficient captures the extent to which the mass of the histogram bars a fixed distance from the median differs if it falls below zero. Our results show that n is significantly negative and about -1/2, implying that histogram bars are reduced by half when they fall below zero. This estimate of n provides strong evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity and suggests that if wages were totally downwardly flexible, the fraction of observations below zero would be double what we observe. Note that we get a significant value for z, the coefficient capturing the pile-up at zero for reasons independent of downward nominal wage rigidity, that amounts to about 5 percent of the wage-change distribution. This suggests that there is some evidence for other nominal rigidities such as long-term contracts in our data. The coefficients on the dummies that we included to test for menu costs, u1, u2 and d1, indicate some support for the idea that small positive wage changes are suppressed.
We find much more significant evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity in the ECI than earlier researchers found in the PSID. Indeed, for wage and salary workers combined--the coverage of the ECI--the PSID shows almost no evidence of downward rigidity: The LSW asymmetry tests (from Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher, 1995) show small and insignificant coefficients, and, the n coefficient (from Kahn, 1997 ) is close to zero. However, using the subset of wage earners only--about 55 percent of the PSID sample--the PSID does provide evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity. The LSW asymmetry results are significantly negative (though only about half as large as in the ECI for the total sample of wage and salaried workers), and the Kahn test finds about half of the desired wage cuts are truncated--very similar to the ECI results.
This raises the question of whether especially severe measurement error in the salary data from the PSID is obscuring the true underlying rigidity of salaries relative to hourly wages. Unfortunately, we cannot separate wage and salary jobs in our data to examine this further. But, even if one were to discount the PSID salary data and focus on the PSID results for wage earners only as representative of the total, our results are still stronger: Because job-average data display less downward rigidity than data on individuals, the underlying rigidity for individual wage earners likely is significantly above estimates from the PSID.
What is the extent of downward nominal rigidity in compensation?
While we find strong evidence of downward nominal rigidity in wages and salaries, firms could vary benefits to achieve more downward flexibility in compensation. Workers' aversion to nominal wage cuts might not extend to benefits, which may be less salient or visible and also may be more difficult to value and compare against workers in other jobs or other establishments. Furthermore, people receive some benefits in real terms rather than nominal terms--a health care or life insurance plan with certain characteristics, for example--and although we certainly expect workers to be averse to a reduction in the amount or quality of these services, workers may be less likely to have a special aversion to a reduction that happens to correspond to a nominal decline in firms' costs. For these reasons, it seems plausible to hypothesize that wages and benefits together could exhibit less downward nominal rigidity than do wages alone. The detailed benefits information in the micro-ECI data allow us to test this hypothesis.
Chart 2 shows the distributions of changes in benefits and overall compensation as well as in wages and salaries. As can be seen, the distribution of benefits appears asymmetric, although less so than that of wages and salaries. The benefits distribution has fewer observations of zero change than does the wages and salaries distribution. And, 18 Our menu costs are not symmetric in that we do not include a dummy to capture wage changes that are two percentage points below zero. We do this for comparability with Kahn (1997) . Including such a variable makes little difference to the n coefficient for wages and salaries and increases the coefficient somewhat (in absolute value) for compensation. although there appears to be a shortage of negative benefits-change observations, note that this is not so for the histogram bar immediately to the left of zero. As for overall compensation, the shortage of negative changes again appears to be less pronounced than for wages and salaries alone, and the spike at zero drops notably when using the more inclusive compensation measure. These observations are also supported by the statistics in table 3. Overall compensation appears less downwardly rigid than wages and salaries alone, with a 5 percentage point larger fraction of negative observations and more than a 4 percentage point smaller LSW asymmetry measure. The fraction of observations at exactly zero change also falls sharply when broadening the definition of compensation. Table 4 presents results of our more direct tests of downward nominal rigidity for the various components of compensation. As in table 2, the results for the LSW asymmetry test are shown in the upper part of the table, and the results for the Kahn test are shown in the lower part. The first column contains the coefficients shown earlier for wages and salaries. As can be seen in the second column, benefits alone are less rigid than wages and salaries. For the Kahn test, the n coefficient is smaller in absolute value (-0.33), though it remains significantly negative; and the correlation of the LSW asymmetry measure for benefits with either inflation or the median of the distribution is small and insignificantly different from zero. When we perform our tests on overall compensation, the size of the n coefficient is -0.38. Taken literally, the results in the third column suggest that about 40 percent of potential compensation cuts are suppressed rather than 1/2 for wages and salaries alone. Note also that for benefits and compensation, the evidence of nominal rigidities other than downward nominal rigidity weakens--the z, u1, u2, and d1 coefficients are smaller, less significant, and in some cases change sign.
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The basic message of table 4 is that, while not eliminating downward rigidity, the inclusion of benefits lessens it. Given that the addition of benefits gives compensation more downward flexibility, it is interesting to know which benefits are driving the results. Woodbury (1983) for a classic reference on wage and benefit substitutability. Other examples of papers finding compensating wage differentials are Gruber (1992) for maternity leave and Currie and Madrian (1999) for health insurance. a time with selected benefits. (The appendix table presents results for the full collection of benefits.) The top row shows the benchmark results for just wages and salaries, and the following rows show results for wages and salaries plus a particular benefit. No benefit in itself fully explains the results for overall compensation, indicating that one must examine combinations of benefits to explain the added flexibility they provide. Nevertheless, a few benefits do have notable effects on the Kahn n parameter. One is nonproduction bonuses, which, given anecdotal evidence about flexible "pay for performance," would be expected to provide some flexibility for firms, despite the fact that these bonuses, on average, only add up to about 1.7 percent of compensation in the ECI. A few other, less performance-specific benefits also seem to play a role. Health insurance and employer contributions to pension and saving plans--which together account for about 10 percent of compensation--also make small contributions to reducing the Kahn n parameter.
Is the Use of Benefits Deliberate?
In the previous section, we presented evidence that compensation is less downwardly rigid than are wages and salaries alone. This finding most naturally suggests that firms manipulate the generosity of benefits in a deliberate attempt to offset downward nominal wage rigidity. But this is not the only possible interpretation of these results. In this section, we present evidence to help distinguish among different interpretations of the greater downward flexibility of total compensation compared with wages alone.
To better understand the relationship between movements in wages and in benefits, it is helpful to ask first what relationship we would expect to find abstracting from issues of downward nominal rigidity. The theoretical and empirical literature suggests two types of relationships between wages and benefits. First, benefits are typically viewed as normal goods in that individuals with higher wage incomes tend also to have higher levels of benefits (Pierce, 2001 ). This would suggest that cuts in wages would tend to be associated with cuts in benefits as well. Certainly this is true in the ECI data for the categories of benefits that are directly tied to wages; as we discussed in section 3 above, the ECI measures of employer costs for paid leave and for overtime and shift premiums move with wages by construction. But for other benefits, the positive correlation between wages and benefits that is evident across individuals at a point in time might be less relevant for year-to-year changes. Annual changes in employers' costs for benefits--for example, health insurance premiums--may have an important exogenous component.
Second, a substantial literature suggests that when comparing jobs that employ workers of similar skill and education levels, we should expect to see a tradeoff--that is, a negative correlation--between wages and benefits. This compensating differential arises because employers providing more generous benefits should be able to hire workers for a lower wage, other things equal.
19 Thus, again in the absence of downward nominal rigidity, a decline in wages might reflect a shift to a lower wage/higher benefit combination and therefore be associated with an increase in benefits. 20 Most importantly, pension plans regulated by ERISA must conform to non-discrimination rules mandating that the plans be made available to a broad range of employees.
With this as background, consider how one might interpret the greater downward flexibility of overall compensation compared with wages and salaries alone. From the perspective of the literature on substitutability and compensating differentials, one would expect that changes in wages that are not achievable because of downward nominal rigidity might instead be reflected in benefits cuts--as we discussed above, workers' aversion to nominal cuts might not be as pronounced for benefits as for wages. This would tend to support the hypothesis that the greater downward flexibility of compensation reflects firms' deliberate attempts to offset downward wage rigidity with benefit cuts. However, the fact that some changes in benefit costs are exogenous to the firm raises the possibility that the greater downward flexibility of compensation could simply reflect fortuitous reductions in benefit costs that, while not linked specifically to the inability to cut nominal wages, nevertheless do lead to more reductions in overall compensation than in wages and salaries alone.
Note as well that the ability of firms to deliberately manipulate benefits to achieve reductions in compensation costs ought to differ considerably across the various types of benefits. Most obviously, legally required benefits cannot be manipulated in this manner; this is why we did not include them in this paper. But even the non-legally required benefits differ in this regard. For example, firms presumably would often like to reduce nominal compensation for some but not all jobs; but by custom, and in some cases by law, certain benefits must be provided equally to all employees at an establishment. 20 The benefits highlighted in table 5 as being most important in generating the reduced downward rigidity in compensation include nonproduction bonuses, which clearly is amenable to deliberate manipulation by firms, and health insurance and pension benefits, which would seem to be less amenable to such manipulation, if only because similar plans usually are available to all employees. Still, reducing the employer's share of health-insurance premiums or the generosity of pension contributions do seem like plausible sources of cost savings for many firms--and health insurance was mentioned as such by several of the firms contacted by Bewley (1998) .
To test for the deliberate manipulation of benefits to offset downward nominal wage rigidity, we examine whether there is any evidence that jobs with zero wage change in a given year--a rough proxy for jobs affected by downward nominal wage rigidity--are more likely to display a cut in nominal benefit costs. Table 6 displays the breakdown of whether the change in the cost of several benefits is negative, zero, or positive, depending on whether the job has a zero change in wages. We hypothesize that, if benefits were used deliberately to offset the inability to cut nominal wages, we would see more reductions in benefits at times when wages display zero change. As can be seen in the shaded cells, a first look at the data reveal no obvious tendency for this to be so, either for overall benefits (excluding legally required benefits), or for any of the benefits that the Kahn test identified as being important in reducing downward nominal rigidity. In fact, proportion of workers with zero wage change who received benefit cuts was smaller than the average proportion receiving benefit cuts: Although 23.1 percent of jobs had a decline in overall benefits, only 19.3 percent of 21 Indeed, among the observations with a decline in nominal wages, more than half have a decline in benefits as well. jobs with zero wage change had a decline in total benefits. Similar results are apparent for each of the benefits examined in table 6. This bivariate comparison is not sufficient to capture the factors leading to a reduction in benefit costs. In particular, given the discussion above about the way that some benefit costs are tied to wages, it will be crucial to control for the general correlation between benefit changes and wage changes before asking whether benefit cuts are especially likely when wages are unchanged.
21 Therefore, we ran probit regressions to explain the probability that a job will have a reduction in benefit costs. The explanatory variables are the wage change itself, a dummy for whether the job has a zero wage change--again, interpreting zero wage change as a proxy for having wages constrained downward--and a variety of control variables (including the unemployment rate, inflation over the preceding twelve months, industry and occupation dummies, unionization, establishment size, region, whether the establishment is in a metropolitan area, and a linear time trend). If benefits were being deliberately reduced to offset downward nominal wage rigidity, we would expect the coefficient on this dummy to have a positive coefficient. However, as can be seen in table 22 The table reports estimates not of the coefficients, but of the change in the probability of a reduction in benefits given a one unit change in the explanatory variable, evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables. 23 If we run the probit omitting the wage change from the explanatory variables, the coefficient on the w=0 dummy becomes positive. But we are loath to interpret this result as evidence in favor of deliberate manipulation of benefits because the result could easily be picking up the positive correlation between changes in wages and in benefits rather than anything specific about zero wage changes associated with downward nominal rigidity. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for emphasizing this issue. 1. Probit regressions explaining the probability of a decline in nominal benefit costs. Figures represent the change in the probability of a reduction in benefits given a one unit change in the explanatory variable. Equations also include the unemployment rate, inflation over the preceding twelve months, industry and occupation dummies, unionization, establishment size, region, whether the establishment is in a metropolitan area, and a linear time trend.
7, the specifications we examined yielded a coefficient that was negative. 22 (Because we have so many observations, standard errors are very small and almost all coefficients are statistically different from zero.) We also considered a dummy for whether the job had a zero wage change in the preceding year, as perhaps a reduction in benefits occurs with a lag; again, the coefficient is negative. This result holds even for nonproduction bonuses, the benefits category that most plausibly can be adjusted by employers. In all, we find no evidence that a cut in benefits is more likely to occur when wages are constrained to show zero change.
23
If firms do not deliberately manipulate benefits in response to the constraints imposed by downward nominal wage rigidity, why then does the inclusion of benefits reduce the extent of downward nominal rigidity? To begin with, benefits display less rigidity than do wages and salaries; as the sum of the two components, then, overall compensation will naturally be less rigid than wages and salaries. Moreover, even if the two components of compensation were equally rigid, their sum could be less rigid than the parts. Statistically, this is just an implication of the central limit theorem, which states that when we combine a large number of independent distributions the resulting distribution is approximately normal and therefore symmetric. Here, we are combining two distributions (the change in wages and salaries and the change in benefits) that are not perfectly correlated; the resulting 24 We performed a Monte Carlo simulation to demonstrate this phenomenon. We generated simulated distributions of wage and benefits changes, each with a Kahn n parameter of -0.5, and let the correlation between the two distributions vary between zero and one. For the case of perfect correlation, the resulting compensation distribution generates n equal to -0.5; this parameter estimate becomes smaller in absolute value as the correlation becomes weaker. distribution tends to be less asymmetric than the original distributions. 24 Economically, when benefit changes are less than perfectly correlated with wage changes, some jobs with zero or small positive wage change will have a decline in benefit costs just by the luck of the draw. For example, if an exogenous reduction in health-insurance premiums led to reductions in health care costs in firms that were unable to lower wages, then there will be more declines in compensation than in wages and salaries. Of course, there are other examples where jobs with negative wage changes will have benefit increases that generate compensation growth.
With downward nominal rigidity, however, there are disproportionately fewer cases of negative wage changes than of zero or small positive wage changes; combining wages with benefits thus leads to a more symmetric distribution for overall compensation.
To be clear, we do not interpret the lack of evidence that firms deliberately use benefits to offset downward wage rigidity to mean that benefits do not in fact provide a source of downward flexibility for firms. If firms base employment decisions on overall compensation costs, then changes in benefit costs, even if they were completely exogenous to the firm, will matter for those decisions. Thus, the results of this section do not call into question our results on the flexibility of compensation relative to wages and salaries alone. Nevertheless, firms do not appear to deliberately vary benefit costs in response to downward nominal wage rigidity, implying that they must adjust on other margins instead.
Conclusions
We examine the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity using the microdata underlying the BLS's employment cost index--an extensive, establishment-based dataset with detailed information on wages and benefit costs. We find that the number of nominal wage cuts is about half of what would be expected in the absence of such rigidity. This is much stronger evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity than found in previous studies using panel data on individuals--especially given that our results are for both wage and salary workers, refer to job-average wages rather than individuals' wages, and do not rely on strong assumptions to correct for measurement error. We also provide the first estimate in the literature of downward nominal rigidity for overall compensation: Compensation displays about onethird less downward rigidity than do wages alone. However, this increased downward flexibility does not seem to reflect firms' deliberate attempts to circumvent wage and salary rigidity using benefits.
One important issue for further research is the relationship between wages and benefits in firms' overall compensation strategy. Our result that firms do not manipulate benefits at the job level to offset downward nominal wage rigidity may be evidence that adjusting benefits is more costly than initially believed. For example, for a variety of reasons, firms may not be able to adjust many benefits, such as health care or retirement, for specific workers or jobs. If firms want to adjust compensation downward for some but not all workers, then, benefits may be an inappropriate tool, even in the face of downward 25 For Japan, Kimura and Ueda (1997) find that industry-level wages do not exhibit much downward rigidity. For Canada, Fortin (1996) argues that downward rigidity is substantial and has led to persistently high unemployment rates in the 1990s; but see Freedman and Macklem (1998) for a dissenting view. nominal wage rigidity.
A second important area for further research is in understanding the effects of downward nominal wage rigidity on aggregate employment and unemployment. The central prediction of simple models based on downward nominal wage rigidity is that, holding constant such factors as productivity growth and the degree of nominal rigidity, low inflation should lead to higher equilibrium unemployment rates. Yet, at least for the United States, the evidence for this hypothesis is not clear.
25 Although Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996) found evidence for such a result, Gordon's (1998) estimates of the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, which he allows to vary over time, are positively correlated with inflation: They rise from the early 1960s through the early 1980s, and decline since then. Whether downward nominal wage rigidity has, in fact, generated the predicted effects on aggregate labor market variables--and if not, understanding why not--remains an important question for future research. 
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